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Abstract
This paper reports results from a real-effort experiment in which men and women
are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a real-effort task. Each
participant receives an equal share of the team’s output. Workers who perform
better than their partner can punish him/her by imposing a fine. We manipulate the
teams’ gender composition (man-man, man-woman, and woman-woman) to analyze
whether an individual’s performance and sanctioning behavior depends on his/her
gender and the gender interaction within the team. The data show that, on average,
men perform slightly better than women. A man’s performance will deteriorate
when paired with a woman, while a woman’s performance will improve when paired
with a woman. When underperforming, women are sanctioned more often and
more heavily than men; if sanctioned, men tend to improve their performance,
while women’s performance does not change.
Keywords: Gender studies, Real-effort task, Team production, Performance,
Punishment, Discrimination.
JEL Classification: M52; J16; C91
1 Introduction
The organization of economic activity within firms relies on teams of individuals who
jointly produce goods and services. In many cases, the team supervisor cannot observe
the contribution of each individual to the team’s output. Hence in practice many firms will
resort to team-based incentives to reward their employees (Lawler and Mohrman (2003);
Boning et al. (2007)). Economists note that such compensation schemes can be inefficient;
if every team member relying on the efforts of his partners reduces his own effort, in
equilibrium, all team members will follow the same strategy and output collapses. Several
theoretical papers argued that such free-riding behavior can be contained if the group can
develop internal monitoring processes and can punish defectors by taking actions that will
diminish defectors’ payoffs.1 Such sanctions need not be monetary; mockery, intimidation
and social exclusion of those who deviate from the group’s norm are ubiquitous phenomena
∗ESSEC Business School and THEMA. PB 50105, 95021 Cergy, France. E-mail: jung@essec.edu
†ESSEC Business School and THEMA. PB 50105, 95021 Cergy, France. E-mail: vranceanu@essec.fr
1See for instance: Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmstrom (1982), McAfee and McMillan (1991),
Itoh (1991), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Legros and Matthews (1993), Barron et al. (1997), Che and Yoo
(2001).
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in modern organizations (Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000)). However, psychologists warn that
beyond the “discipline” effect, sanctions might entail undesired outcomes, because they
generate negative emotions that might hamper performance, which has been termed the
“motivation crowding-out” effect (for a survey, see Frey and Jegen (2001) and Festre´ and
Garrouste (2014)).2
One important characteristic of production teams is their gender composition. Men
and women might present different behavioral responses to incentives (positive or neg-
ative), and more important, their behavior may change depending on the gender with
which they are paired. Whether a group’s gender composition affects the performance
of the group members is an important research question, especially for the management
of the firms that are moving from all-man to mixed gender work-teams. Yet, as Kuhn
and Villeval (2013) emphasize, “compared to the literature on gender and tournaments,
the economics literature on gender and teams is sparse”. The aim of the present paper
is to contribute to the literature on gender discrimination in the workplace by studying
performance and punishment behavior of workers paired with a same/different gender
partner in a real-effort task.
Some recent empirical studies have shown that the gender composition of a team has
an impact on the team’s performance. For instance, Apesteguia et al. (2012) analyze
information from a large database on a well-known business game played by self-selected
teams of three students (StratX-l’Ore´al). They show that, even when controlling for
personal characteristics, all-women teams perform worse than all-men and mixed teams.
A similar result is obtained by Lamiraud and Vranceanu (2014) using panel data from a
different business game (Kalyste´e-l’Ore´al) with random allocation of students to teams
of five. In their study, all-men and mixed teams with a majority of women perform the
best. Hoogendoorn et al. (2013) collect data on companies created and operated for one
academic year by students enrolled in the entrepreneurship program of the Amsterdam
College of Applied Sciences and find that business teams with an equal gender mix perform
better than male-dominated teams in terms of profits and sales. In a different setting,
Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015) study identical experimental assets markets in separate groups
of men and groups of women; they show that chances of price bubbles to appear are much
higher in markets with men traders, than in markets with women traders.
There a significant body of literature on gender differences in the workplace to which
our work can be related. Acknowledging that men-women wage discrimination, discrim-
inatory hiring and promotion processes unfavorable to women are still ubiquitous in the
Western countries, in the last few years experimental economists aimed at revealing the
underlying factors at the origin of these worrisome phenomena (see the survey by Az-
mat and Petrongolo (2014)). At the individual level, it is generally accepted now that
women are more averse to risk than men (Eckel and Grossman (2008); Croson and Gneezy
(2009)).3 If risk taking is a factor of success in many well-paid jobs (traders, CEOs), this
would explain the employers’ preference for men. Another well-documented observed be-
havior is that women are more averse to competition than men (Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007, 2011); Croson and Gneezy (2009)).4 In this case, men reaching higher positions
2The potentially detrimental effect of sanctions and the stimulating effect of refraining from imposing
sanctions, have already been emphasized by experimental economists who studied the principal/agent
game (Dickinson and Villeval (2008); Kirstein (2008)), the trust game (Fehr and List (2004); Fehr and
Rockenbach (2003); Houser et al. (2008)) or the ultimatum game (Gneezy (2003)).
3This result has recently been challenged based on the weakness of the statistical tests used to confirm
it (Filippin and Crosetto (2014)).
4Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) build their analysis on two-stage real-effort task experiment (solving
2
in a company hierarchy (and high wages) might be explained by men’s higher propensity
to “fight” for that positions. Kuhn and Villeval (2013) use a real-effort experiment to
analyze gender differences regarding self-selection in teams with the compensation as an
equal share of the team’s output.5 They show that women have a preference for team
work (a cooperative environment), whereas men would prefer individual tasks (a more
competitive environment). Ortmann and Tichy (1999) use a Prisoner’s Dilemma game to
show that women have a greater propensity to cooperate than men, but their desire to
cooperate fades when the game is repeated. Whether such gender specific traits (aversion
to risk or aversion to competition) are innate or educated, the question is still open to
debate.
Other papers, closer to ours, study how gender interaction in groups affects on indi-
vidual behavior. It has been argued by psychologists that women may exhibit greater
solidarity with women than with men (Tajfel (1981)) and, conversely, that women may
regard other women as competitors (Buss (1998); Campbell (1999); Kanazawa (2005)).
Gneezy (2003) reports that, when the compensation scheme becomes more competitive,
women increase their performance only when they compete with women, but not when
they compete with men. Differences in how men (women) react when paired with same
(opposite) gender partners have been observed in standard Ultimatum games. Eckel and
Grossman (2001) find that women make more generous offers than men, that offers made
by women do not depend on the partner’s gender, and that they are more likely to be
accepted. Solnick (2001) finds that women and men do similar offers, but women are more
demanding than men when the opposer is female, and less demanding when the opposer
is male. In a 2x2 design male/female, origin of Jewish immigrants to Israel (Ashkenazic
/ Sephardic), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found that males (but not females) discrimi-
nated against Ashkenazic men (but not against women), offering them less than they did
to Sephardic men.
The Dictator game is also interesting for the study of gender interactions since it rules
out strategic behavior. Ben-Ner et al. (2004) conduct several dictator game experiments
in which women and men are allowed to divide ten dollars with a completely unknown
person, or a person of a known gender. They found that women give systematically less
to women than to men and persons of an unknown gender. There is no clear evidence
on whether women give more or less than men in dictator games, and whether the gifts
depend on the gender of the recipient (Azmat and Petrongolo (2014)). Dufwenberg and
Muren (2006) show that women receive more favorable treatment than men in the dictator
game.
In order to analyze how the team gender composition affects on performance and
sanctioning behavior of individuals in the group, we extend the real-effort experiment
introduced by Mohnen et al. (2008) to allow for explicit peer punishment. In this exper-
iment, the compensation scheme is cooperative, being similar to the team-based pay as
applied by many contemporary firms. As a particular development in this paper, at the
outset of the experiment participants were randomly assigned to mixed gender, all-men
and all-women teams, in a standard between-subjects design, where a subject cannot
participate in more than one experimental session. We used a ”smooth” communication
mazes). Although there are no gender differences in performance in the first stage, in the next stage,
men select a tournament payment scheme rather than piece-wise pay twice as often as do women.
5Their experiment builds on a coding task. When they choose team production, subjects guess the
gender of the partner by learning his/her first name. Partners on teams receive an equal split of the joint
output.
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method to ensure that team members were aware of their partner’s gender while at the
same time preserving the anonymity of the participants. Thus, this experiment aims at
capturing the “genuine gender effect”, independent on any emotions and social stances
that would develop if partners can establish eye contact or communicate. Participants
were asked to count the 7s in blocs of figures successively displayed on the computer
screen during six successive rounds of four minutes each. This task was introduced by
Mohnen et al. (2008) and Pokorny (2008) who note that it is interesting for experimental
research because it does not require any particular skill or computing ability. At each
round, individuals receive an equal share of the team’s output, which is proxied by the
total number of correct answers.6 In our experiment, as in Mohnen et al. (2008), if a
participant chooses to rest, he/she can press a button, and the screen is blocked for a 20s
period for which he/she receives a small lump-sum payment (as the opportunity cost of
working). Payoffs are calibrated such that without punishment individuals have an in-
centive to free ride (they are paid for resting). However, in this paper, the best performer
on a team has the option to punish the less productive partner by applying a monetary
sanction (Vranceanu et al. (2014)).
Taking stock on the existing literature on gender composition and team performance
which shows that all-women teams record relatively poorer performances than mixed
teams, we might make the hypothesis according to which, when a women is teamed with
a women, her performance would deteriorate. In line with the observed discrimination
in the workplace, we might hypothesize that, at equivalent performance gap, women
are sanctioned more often than men. Would men and women respond differently to a
sanction? Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008) analyzed why relatively fewer women decide to
major in economics; they found that women’s decision to drop these classes is motivated
by the poor grades they receive in the introductory courses in economics, whereas men
are less discouraged by the negative signal provided by the same poor grades.
In essence, our results indicate that, in this specific task, on average, men perform
(slightly) better than women. In teams, if a men is teamed with a women his performance
will deteriorate, yet, contrary to what we would expect, if a women is teamed with another
women her performance will improve. When under-performing, women are sanctioned
more frequently than men. Finally, in line with the findings by Rask and Tiefenthaler
(2008), when sanctioned, men’s performance improves whereas women’s performance does
not, as if in the case of women a strong motivation crowding out effect will offset the
discipline effect.7
The paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the experimental design.
Section 3 presents the data and the main descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces
several regression models. The final section presents our conclusions and provides some
managerial implications, with all of the caveats related to the challenge of extrapolating
from such simple experiments conclusions deemed to be relevant for managers in “nuts
and bolts” firms.
6Notice that this compensation scheme should encourage cooperation, as in the experiment by Kuhn
and Villeval (2013), and would part from the competitive environment specific to the experiments by
Gneezy (2003) or Niederle and Vesterlund (2007, 2011), in which individual pay is based on a tournament.
7We also used the dataset of Vranceanu et al. (2014) to check that there is no gender effect in groups
that play a similar real-effort task without knowing the gender of the partner.
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2 Experimental design
All subjects were recruited from the student population of the ESSEC Business School
(France), who answered an advertisement for paid decision experiments.8 Five sessions
were organized at the ESSEC Experimental Lab with a total of 100 subjects in October
2014, November 2014 and January 2015 (Table 1). At the beginning of the experiment,
subjects are matched in pairs at random. The team composition is not changed across
rounds. Interaction is anonymous, and hence subjects do not know who their partners
are. They play the game on a computer screen and cannot establish eye contact with one
another; instructions (provided in the Appendix) and data collection are computerized;
the program was developed using z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).9 Payoffs are denominated
in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), with an exchange rate 100 ECU = 2.5 Euros.
In a typical round, subjects are asked to count the number of 7s in blocks of random
numbers, successively displayed on the computer screen over four minutes (Mohnen et al.
(2008); Pokorny (2008); Vranceanu et al. (2014)). The typical bloc has 30 columns and
6 rows (see Appendix); in each bloc, the number of 7s varies at random between 11 and
24, with an average of 18. Note that difficulty of the task depends on the total number
of figures in a bloc (180), and not on the number of 7s, and thus it should not vary from
one bloc to another. At the beginning of the experiment, the computer displays the first
block. When the participant finishes to count, he/she indicates the number of 7s in a
box, than clicks on “validate”; the computer records the answer (and checks it), then
displays another block of figures. Thus the number of blocks displayed during the four
minutes of a representative round depends on the speed of counting of the participant.
Note that instead of counting, the participant has also the alternative to rest; if he presses
the button “time-out”, the computer cancels the count task by displaying a neutral screen
(Essec logo) for 20 seconds.10 If the participant chooses this option, he will earn a small
lump-sum (6 ECU). This second option can be viewed as an opportunity cost of working.
The experiment comprises six identical 4-minute rounds.
When the four minutes elapse, the round is over and participants learn the number
of correct answers they have provided, as well as the number of correct answers provided
by their partner. We choose on purpose to disclose only the key performance measure of
the partner, which is his/her number of correct answers, and not the number of blocks
worked on or the number of times the time-out button was pressed. This information
structure of the experiment aims to account for real life situations where partners in
team can observe the essentials of the contribution of the team mates to the team’s
output, but do not know “everything” about the partner. In particular, it is reasonable
to think that partners in a “real” team cannot disentangle which of a higher effort and or
better skills explains a higher individual output. Of course, results of the paper depend
on the information structure of the experiment, and, should we decide to provide more
information to partners, results might be different.
Then, the player who out-performed (i.e., provided more correct answers than the
other) is asked whether he/she wishes to impose a penalty on his/her partner. If he/she
answers “yes”, he/she can penalize the other player by an amount p, where p varies
8As “Grande Ecole” students, this group is relatively homogenous in terms of computing and intel-
lectual abilities, age and educational background. It should be acknowledged that students are admitted
at ESSEC after succeeding in a very competitive national exam, with a demanding test in mathematics.
9The computer program was developed by Delphine Dubart at the ESSEC Experimental Lab.
10The time-out button is deactivated 20 seconds before the end of the round (this is the average time
needed to count the 7s in the last block of numbers).
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between 1 and 30 ECUs. Punishment is costly: each unit of sanction entails a cost of 0.30
ECUs for the punisher. Such a linear punishment technology, involving a constant cost
per unit of punishment has been used in many other studies (Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000);
Falk and Fischbacher (2005); Nikiforakis and Normann (2008)). In the event of equal
performance, no penalty can be imposed. After the punishment decision is made, players
learn their ECU payoff for the round.
For each round, a player’s reward is calculated according to a simple rule (1). Let us
consider a team composed of players i and j. Let Nit (respectively Njt) be the number of
correct answers provided by the individual j (respectively j) in round t. Without any loss
of generality, let us assume that Njt > Nit. The first term is a linear function in the sum
of correct answers provided by the two players. Next term, is the payoff associated to
the breaks; if the participant pressed the time-out button for k times, he/she also obtains
the associated payoff of k times 6 ECU. Finally, since Njt > Nit, individual j can punish
individual i by imposing a penalty pjit ∈ [0; 30]. Compensation functions for each player
are: {
Zit = 10
Nit+Njt
2
+ 6kit − pjit
Zjt = 10
Nit+Njt
2
+ 6kjt − 0.3pjit . (1)
Payments for all rounds will be converted into cash and paid at the end of the exper-
iment.
Note that the parameters of the game were selected such that, without punishment,
free-riding (i.e., pressing the time-out button) is the dominant strategy. An individual
who makes a normal effort to count the 7s can provide a correct answer in 20 seconds on
average. If the other player does the same, both would earn 10 ECUs. However, if one
presses the time-out button (blocks the screen and rests for 20 seconds) while the other
works and provides a correct answer, the player who free rides obtains 11 ECUs (and
the other receives 5ECUs). Clearly, 11 ECUs and resting is better than 10 ECUs and
executing the boring task. If both players free ride and press the time-out button, they
each get 6 ECUs.
As already mentioned, the paper aims at analyzing the impact of the teams’ gender
composition on individual performance, and on punishment behavior. To do so, we ma-
nipulate the gender composition of the groups, to create mixed teams, man-man teams
and woman-woman teams. Subjects signed up for a specific session. We ensure that
students who participated in one treatment could not participate in another treatment.
It was important to ensure that team members were aware of the gender of their
partner, without conveying this information in a salient way. We thus organized sessions
to which only men (only women) were invited, and mixed-gender sessions with an equal
number of men and women. In the single-gender sessions participants can clearly observe
that only men (women) are present, so they must be paired with a same-gender partner.
In the mixed gender sessions, all pairs were mixed but individuals cannot observed it
directly. Thus, to convey information on the gender of the partner in a non-directive way
and without relaxing anonymity, at the beginning of the experiment, participants were
asked to complete an electronic form concerning their “personal characteristics” - age,
gender and level of education. Immediately thereafter, the information was communicated
to the other team member as “basic information” about his/her partner. In our student
population, ages and levels of education are not differentiating characteristics. The only
distinctive characteristic was gender, but no emphasis was placed on this. At the end of
the experiment, we asked students whether they could recall the gender of their partner,
and if so, what the gender was; 2 out of 100 subjects (one man and one women) could
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Table 1: Sessions and Treatments
Date Treatment Number of Subjects Number of Teams
Oct 23 2014 WW 26 13
Nov 7 2014 MW 24 12
Nov 18 2014 MM 18 9
Dec 5 2014 MW 18 9
Jan 14 2014 MM 14 7
not recall this. This is a good indication that, while students knew the gender of their
partner, they did not focus on it.
Table 1 presents the distribution of subjects with respect to sessions and treatments:
On average, the experiment took approximately 50 minutes. Subjects earned 15.2 Euros
on average.
3 Data and basic statistics
Among the 100 students who participated in the experiment, 47 were female. Thus 47
individuals were paired with a female partner. Each subject performed the task for 6
rounds; the dataset thus includes 600 observations.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics, for the whole sample (first panel) and sepa-
rately for the population of men and women (second and third panels).
There are two key indicator variables that capture the gender profile of individuals
and teams - FE (1 if subject is a woman, 0 if it is a man) and FEp (1 if the partner is a
woman, 0 if it is man). Their interaction term FE×FEp is also useful (by construction,
it takes the value 1 if the subject is a woman and is paired with a woman). Detailed
definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix.
3.1 Individual performance
The key measure of performance is the number correct answers provided by individual i
in round t, denoted by NRAit. The full-sample average performance per round is approx-
imately 9.90 correct answers, with men performing slightly better than women (10.26 vs.
9.86); the difference is nonetheless statistically significant, a result that contrasts with
findings by Kuhn and Villeval (2013) or Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) who observed
no gender difference in performance, using various real-effort tasks (coding and solving
mazes, respectively).
Figure 1 simply presents the evolution of the number of correct answers across rounds
for both men and women. In all rounds men performed better than women. We can also
observe that performance improves from rounds 1 to 5 indicating the presence of some
learning effect (Benndorf et al. (2014)). One would expect the latter to fade away across
rounds, being offset by fatigue and boredom, which appear to have set in round 6 when
performance declines for both men and women. However, because our experiment builds
on a between-subjects design, the learning effect should not be a problem.
A less precise measure of performance, but one independent of the ability to count
correctly, is the number of blocks counted by individual i in round t, whatever the score
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Sd Min Max
FE 100 0.47 0.50 0 1
FEp 100 0.47 0.50 0 1
FExFEp 100 0.26 0.44 0 1
NRA 600 9.86 3.28 0 18
NBLOCK 600 12.00 4.88 1 43
NTIMEOUT 600 0.62 1.50 0 11
DIFSC 600 0.00 4.04 -11 11
SANC 275 0.19 0.40 0 1
MSANC 275 2.87 7.49 0 30
MSANC cond. SANC=1 53 14.91 10.62 1 30
Male Sample
FEp 53 0.40 0.49 0 1
NRA 318 10.26 3.43 0 18
NBLOCK 318 13.00 5.88 1 43
NTIMEOUT 318 0.64 1.72 0 11
DIFSC 318 0.60 4.29 -11 11
SANC 171 0.22 0.41 0 1
MSANC 171 3.36 8.21 0 30
MSANC cond. SANC=1 37 15.51 11.16 1 30
Female Sample
FEp 47 0.55 0.50 0 1
NRA 282 9.41*** 3.04 1 17
NBLOCK 282 10.88*** 3.05 1 22
NTIMEOUT 282 0.59 1.21 0 8
DIFSC 282 -0.67*** 3.62 -11 10
SANC 104 0.15 0.36 0 1
MSANC 104 2.08 6.08 0 30
MSANC cond. SANC=1 16 13.50 9.44 2 30
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 of T-test between genders
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Figure 1: Performance Evolution over Rounds by Gender
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(which can be correct or not), NBLOCKit.
From Table 2, we observe that on average participants counted 12 blocks per round,
with men counting 13 and women counting 10.88 blocks, the difference being statistically
significant.
Using these data, it is difficult to determine whether the gender differences in per-
formance as measured by the two former measures stem form differences in abilities (at-
tention and speed of counting) or the deliberate choice to free-ride. Some indication is
provided by the number of times that a participant chose to press the time-out button
(NTIMEOUT ), which is a good proxy for free riding behavior. With respect to this
measure, the difference between men and women is statistically insignificant. Men tend
to take more time-outs (0.64) than women (0.59), while their counting performance is bet-
ter. This suggests that the gender differences in performance observed in this experiment
are driven by counting skills and not by alleged shirking of female subjects.
3.2 Gender interaction and individual performance
Table 3, Figures 4 and 5 decompose the individual performance and free-riding measures
(NRA and NTIMEOUT ) (as a total for the whole six rounds of the experiment), in
terms of gender compositions: depending on who (a male or a female) was paired with
whom (a male or a female).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics by Gender Composition
Obs Mean Sd Min Max
Performance (Number of Correct Answers)
Man with Man 192 10.55 3.32 1 18
Man with Woman 252 9.08 3.50 0 18
Woman with Woman W 156 10.28 2.54 4 17
Woman with Man 126 8.33 3.27 1 16
Free-Riding (Number of Time-out Button Pressed)
Man with Man Partner 192 0.43 1.07 0 7
Man with Woman 252 0.92 2.03 0 11
Woman with Woman 156 0.35 0.61 0 3
Woman with Man 126 0.89 1.64 0 8
Figure 2: Performance by Gender Com-
position
Figure 3: Free-Riding Behavior by Gen-
der Composition
‘
These basic statistics suggest that:11
Men paired with another man have the best individual performance (number of right
answers), and also a low propensity to free-ride. When paired with a woman, men’s
(individual) performance will deteriorate and free-riding will increase.
However, the individual performance of women teamed with a woman is quite strong,
and they less prone to free- ride. Yet, when women are paired with a man, their perfor-
mance will decline sharply and free-riding will edge-up.
————————————
3.3 Sanctioning behavior
Another important measure is the difference in the number of correct answers between
the two partners (i, j) in a round t, DIFSCt = NRAit − NRAjt. By definition of this
variable, the full-sample average difference in performance between partners is 0 (a positive
performance of individual i with respect to j is offset by the negative performance of j
with respect to i). Simple comparisons of the data in the second and third panels in Table
11In the next section, regression models will allow to show that these findings are robust to various
addtional controls.
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2 indicate that men perform significantly better than women.
The sanctioning behavior is captured by two measures. From the design section, we
know that in any round the best performer in a team can, if he/she wishes, impose a
monetary sanction on his/her partner in the range [0;30] ECU, at a cost of 0.30ECU per
one ECU of penalty. Sanctions could be applied in 275 cases in which one individual
performed strictly better than the other. Conditional on performing better, 19% of indi-
viduals impose penalties on their partners (SANC = 1), for an average sanction amount
(MSANC) equal to 2.64 ECU. Conditional on imposing a fine to the partner, the average
amount of the sanction is 14.91 ECU.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the evolution of the sanction amount across rounds by gender. In
the second round, individuals tend to impose the highest fines, which gradually decrease
over time. One interesting point is that individuals still impose sanctions in the last
round despite it being costly. An explanation for this phenomenon was provided by
Camerer and Fehr (2006) who acknowledged the existence of a large proportion of “strong
reciprocators”, i.e., individuals who show a combination of altruistic reward and altruistic
punishment, defined as the propensity to impose sanctions on others for norm violations.
Such strong reciprocators will bear the cost of imposing punishment even if they gain no
individual benefit.
Figure 4: Frequency of Applying Sanc-
tions across Rounds by Gender
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Figure 5: Average Amount of Sanction
across Rounds by Gender
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Simple comparisons of the data in the second and third panels of Table 2 show that men
tend to apply sanctions more often than women (22% compared to 15%), and charge on
average a higher amount than women (15.51 ECUs compared to 13.50 ECUs) conditional
on imposing a fine to the partner.
3.4 Gender interaction and sanction behavior
Table 4, Figures 6 and 7 show the frequency of sanctioning and the average amount of
the sanction for each gender type of subject (male, female) depending on the gender of
the partner (male, female), for the whole six rounds of the experiment.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Sanction by Gender Composition
Obs Mean Sd Min Max
Sanction Frequency
Man with Man 87 0.11 0.32 0 1
Man with Woman 84 0.32 0.47 0 1
Woman with Woman 69 0.19 0.39 0 1
Woman with Man 35 0.09 0.28 0 1
Amount of Sanction cond. SANC=1
Man with Man 10 10.80 9.46 2 30
Man with Woman 27 17.26 11.39 1 30
Woman with Woman 13 12.38 9.28 2 30
Woman with Man 3 18.33 10.41 10 30
Figure 6: Sanction Frequency by Gender
Composition
Figure 7: Amount of Sanction cond.
SANC=1 by Gender Composition
As a key finding, it turns out that on average men will impose higher sanctions on
their woman partner than on a man partner (10.8 vs. 17.26), and women will impose
higher sanctions on men than on women (10.41 vs. 9.28).
3.5 Pairwise correlations
Table 5 presents the pairwise correlation matrix of our variables of interest. The two
measures of performance (NRA and NBLOCK) exhibit a high and significant correlation
(0.63). Thus, for the sake of parsimony, in the following analyses we will consider only
the number of correct answers as a measure of performance.
The number of time-outs is negatively and significantly correlated (-0.24) with the
number of correct answers produced by an individual. As expected, a higher difference in
scores (tantamount to lower relative performance) is associated with a higher frequency
of punishment and a higher sanction amount.
In line with the above mentioned findings, while women tend to sanction their partner
less frequently than men do (although the difference is insignificant) and charge a lower
amount, they tend to be sanctioned more often, and be charged a higher amount (as
shown by the positive and significant coefficient between FEp and SANC (respectively
MSANC)).
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Table 5: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Variables of Interest
FE FEp NRA NBLOCK NTIMEOUT DIFSC SANC MSANC
FE 1
FEp 0.157*** 1
NRA -0.130** 0.0632 1
NBLOCK -0.218*** 0.0285 0.633*** 1
NTIMEOUT -0.0164 0.00363 -0.241*** 0.0142 1
DIFSC -0.157*** 0.157*** 0.615*** 0.339*** -0.167*** 1
SANC -0.0769 0.195** -0.107 0.0375 0.117 0.227*** 1
MSANC -0.0830 0.184** 0.0117 0.139* 0.105 0.306*** 0.786*** 1
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Several regression models will allow us to move beyond these elementary findings.
Throughout our experiments, there was one male and one female participants who could
not recall their partner’s gender. We will exclude these two persons from subsequent
analyses.
4 Regression analysis
4.1 The general regression model
We develop several regression models aiming to explain the determinants of individual
performance, free-riding, and sanctioning/sanctioned behavior. Since the focus of the
analysis falls on the effects brought about by the gender composition of the teams, models
use as gender-specific covariates the two indicator variables as mentioned before: FE (1
if subject is a woman, 0 if the subject is a man) and FEp (1 if the partner is a woman,
0 if the partner is a man), as well as their interaction term (FE × FEp).
In a general form, the random-effects models estimated below can be written as:
yit = β
′Xit + α1FE + α2FEp+ α3FE × FEp+ ui + it (2)
where yit stands for the various outcome variables pertaining to an individual i (at round
t) such as performance as captured by the number of right answers (NRA), free-riding
as proxied by the number of time-outs (NTIMEOUT ), the occurrence of the sanction
(SANCT = 1) or the amount of the sanction (MSANC). X is the vector of covariates
other than the gender indicators such as the past period’s sanction (MSANC−1), the
current and past, absolute and relative performance (NRA−1, DIFSC−1 or DIFSC),
round dummies, and various interaction terms with the female dummy (FE×MSANC−1,
FE×DIFSC−1 or FEp×DIFSC). The error term ui aims at capturing the individual
random effect and it represents the standard error term.
It is important to note that when the interaction term is present, α1 can be interpreted
as the impact of FE (being a female subject) on y when FEp = 0 (having a men partner).
Also, α2 can be interpreted as the impact of FEp (having a female partner) on y when
FE = 0 (the subject is a men), which is tantamount to saying of the impact on y of
being a men with a female partner. More precisely, the marginal effect of being a women
depends on whether she is teamed with a men or a women:
∂y
∂FE
= α1 + α3FEp, and,
the marginal effect of having a female partner depends on the subject is a female or a
male:
∂y
∂FEp
= α2 +α3FE. Note that the marginal effect of being a women who is paired
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with another woman is constant:
∂2y
∂FE∂FEp
= α3 (see Greene (1993) and Braumoeller
(2004)).
The set of alpha coefficients also allows to grasp the impact of a team composition
on the individual output variable. By definition of our gender indicator variables, the
reference is the group of men who are paired with men [MM]. As already mentioned, α1
estimates the impact of being female who is paired with a male partner and α2 represents
the impact of being male who is paired with a female partner. Thus the impact on
individual output of being a woman teamed up with woman [W,W] is estimated by (α1 +
α2 + α3).
Team Gender Composition Dummy Values Marginal Effects
Men paired with men [M,M] (FE=0,FEp=0) Reference point
Women paired with men [W,M] (FE=1,FEp=0) α1
Men paired with women [M,W] (FE=0,FEp=1) α2
Women paired with women [W,W] (FE=1,FEp=1) (α1 + α2 + α3)
4.2 The performance regression model
The first regression model aims at analyzing the determinants of performance. The depen-
dent variable is the number of correct answers (NRA) provided by an individual. Besides
the gender indicator variables, a key explanatory variable is the past period’s sanction
(MSANC−1). The number of correct answers in the previous round (NRA−1) is used as
a control for the individual’s ability in this task, including the net learning effect. Round
dummies allow us to capture the residual learning/boredom effect (not captured by the
coefficient on NRA−1). Because we include one-period lagged variables, the dataset com-
prises only observations from round 2 to round 6. It also excludes the two individuals
who mis-specified their partners, which leaves 490 observations from five rounds for 98
individuals.
Table 6 presents the output of the panel data random-effects regression model. The
model in column 1 does not include the interaction between being a female and receiving
a sanction at the previous round, whereas this interaction is included in column 2.
The impact of the group composition on the individual’s performance can be gauged
by the statistical significant coefficients of alphas in the first model:
Gender Composition Marginal Effects
Women paired with men [W,M] α1 = −0.878
Men paired with women [M,W] α2 = −0.464
Women paired with women [W,W] α1 + α2 + α3 = −0.378
Remark: [M,M] groups as a reference point
Therefore, individual performance across teams follows the order of [M,M ] > [W,W ] >
[M,W ] > [W,M ] (the gender order in the team stands for [subject, partner]).
Key findings are listed below:
R1. When a man is paired with a woman, his performance deteriorates compared to
having a man partner, according to the negative coefficient on FEp, α2 = −0.464.
R2. When a woman is paired with a man, her performance strongly deteriorates
compared to having a women partner, according to the coefficient on FE, α1 = −0.878.
We can turn now to the central theme of the analysis, the strategies and consequences
of punishment.
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Table 6: Performance: the random-effects model
(1) (2)
NRA NRA
NRA(−1) 0.749*** 0.749***
(0.04) (0.04)
MSANC(−1) 0.015 0.094**
(0.02) (0.04)
FE -0.878*** -0.742**
(0.28) (0.29)
FEp -0.464* -0.464*
(0.27) (0.27)
FExFEp 0.964** 0.892**
(0.40) (0.40)
FExMSANC(−1) -0.105**
(0.05)
Round3 0.038 0.022
(0.31) (0.31)
Round4 -0.366 -0.369
(0.32) (0.32)
Round5 0.637** 0.666**
(0.32) (0.32)
Round6 -0.644* -0.618*
(0.34) (0.34)
cons 3.602*** 3.552***
(0.39) (0.39)
chi2 639.022 649.496
N 490 490
r2 w 0.117 0.120
r2 b 0.941 0.943
r2 o 0.571 0.576
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Robust S.E Clustered at the individual level.
Individuals who mis-specify their partners’ gender are excluded
We consider only Round2-Round6 in order to take into account
the value at t− 1
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R3. On average, if a male subject was sanctioned in the previous round, he tends
to perform better in the present round. The gain in performance is proportional to the
amount of the sanction.
This can be inferred from the positive coefficient of MSANC−1, (0.094) which is
statistically significant in model 2. In presence of a significant interaction term FE ×
MSANC(−1), this coefficient on MSANC−1 indicates the marginal effect of the past
sanction, conditional upon FE being zero (the subject is a man).
R4. However, if a woman was sanctioned at the previous round, her performance in
the current round will not improve.
This is shown by the marginal effect of the sanction if the subject is a women, that is
the sum of the coefficients of MSANC−1 and FE ×MSANC−1 in model 2 (i.e. 0.094 +
(−0.105) ≈ 0).
It appears that the motivation crowding-out effect mainly affects female subjects, a
result in line with findings by Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008).
R5. Performance improves across rounds, but conditionally on individual abilities,
the round effects are rather mixed.
Finally, we also assessed whether an excessive sanction might entail a motivation
crowding-out effect by including a quadratic term of the MSANC variable in the above
mentioned regression models. Its coefficient is negative, which would suggest support for
the motivation crowding-out theory, but it is not statistically significant.
4.3 Determinants of the free-riding behavior
As we have emphasized, the number of times that subjects pressed the time-out button
provides a indication of their propensity to free ride (and take the risk of being sanctioned).
On average men press the button more often than women. As NTIMEOUT and NRA
are negatively correlated, one could imagine that the motivational factors determining free
riding can be explained similarly to those driving performance. We therefore estimate the
same type of regression model as in the previous section, but here use NTIMEOUT as
the dependent variable. The sample includes the same 490 observations. Table 7 reports
results of the random-effects panel data regression.
The coefficients of alphas in the first model is given as follows:
Gender Composition Marginal Effects
Women paired with men [W,M] α1 = 0.210
Men paired with women [M,W] α2 = 0.531
Women paired with women [W,W] α1 + α2 + α3 = −0.168
Remark: [M,M] groups as a reference point
Therefore subject free-riding across teams [subject, partner] follows the order [M,W ] >
[W,M ] > [M,M ] > [W,W ].
We can note that:
R6. Better-performing individuals tend to free-ride (press the time-out button) less
often.
This is indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of NRA−1.
R7. Controlling for individual ability, on average subjects tend to free-ride (press the
time-out button) more often when paired with the opposite gender. Individuals in mixed
teams tend to free ride more than individuals in same gender teams.
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Table 7: Determinant of Free-Riding (The Number of Times the Time-Out Button was
Pressed): the random-effects model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTIMEOUT NTIMEOUT NTIMEOUT NTIMEOUT
NRA(−1) -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.097***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
MSANC (-1) -0.013 -0.040 -0.011 -0.041
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
FE 0.210 0.153 0.224 0.167
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
FEp 0.531*** 0.535*** 0.528*** 0.532***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
FExFEp -0.909*** -0.883*** -0.920*** -0.894***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
FExMSANC(−1) 0.037 0.039
(0.03) (0.03)
FExDIFSC(−1) 0.016 0.019
(0.03) (0.03)
Round3 -0.039 -0.034 -0.035 -0.029
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Round4 0.480** 0.481** 0.486** 0.488**
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Round5 0.407* 0.396* 0.416* 0.407*
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Round6 0.521** 0.512** 0.535** 0.527**
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
cons 1.175*** 1.196*** 1.197*** 1.223***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
chi2 36.664 38.201 36.903 38.557
N 490 490 490 490
r2 w 0.078 0.082 0.078 0.083
r2 b 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.000
r2 o 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.068
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Robust S.E Clustered at the individual level.
Individuals who mis-specify their partners’ gender are excluded
We consider only Round2-Round6 in order to take into account
the value at t− 1
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R8. If a man is paired with a woman, he free-rides more often than when paired with
a man, according to the positive coefficient on FEp.
R9. If a women is paired with a men, she free-rides more often than when paired
with a women, according to the comparison of the positive (or insignificant) α1 and the
negative (α1 + α2 + α3).
R10. Over time, boredom or fatigue prompts participants to press the time-out button
more often.
All coefficients for rounds 4 to 6 are positive and statistically significant.
4.4 The sanction regression model
We can turn now our attention to the determinants of sanctioning behavior. To do so,
we estimate several regression models, using as a dependent variable either the indicator
variable SANC (1 if a sanction is imposed) or the ECU amount of the sanction, MSANC.
There were initially 275 observations for which the sanction option was available (i.e., the
subject performed better than his/her partner); however, five observations from the two
individuals who mis-specified their partners must be excluded. As there are six rounds,
we can treat this dataset as panel data, thereby allowing us to use a random-effects
model to control for both individuals and time effects. As dependent variables we use
the same gender indicator variables as in the performance equation (FE, FEp and their
interaction), to which we add the difference in scores between the two partners (DIFSC)
and the interaction term FEp × DIFSC. Given that we control now for the difference
in performance (on average men tend to have a better performance in this task), the
indicator variables would capture the “plain” gender effect.
Table 8 reports the estimation output. We use three different specifications for both
SANC and MSANC; columns (1) and (4) present the regression model without inter-
action terms, columns (2) and (5) include the FE × FEp interaction term, and columns
(3) and (6) include the FEp×DIFSC interaction term.
This brings us to:
R11. The frequency of imposing sanctions and the amount of the sanction is positively
related to the difference in the number of correct answers (performance). In other words,
the worse the relative performance of the poor performer on the team is, the higher will
be his/her sanction (or likelihood of receiving a sanction).
This is shown by the positive and significant coefficient on DIFSC in models (1), (2),
and (4).
R12. When women perform poorly, they tend to be penalized significantly more than
men.
This is reflected by the positive coefficient of FEp (strongly significant in models (1),
(2), (4)).
R13. The sanction response to poor performance is stronger when the poor performer
on the team is a woman
Indeed, the coefficients of the interaction term between FEp (the partner is a woman)
and DIFSC (the difference in performance between team members) is significantly pos-
itive.
R14. Women tend to sanction less (not significant).
This is shown by the negative coefficient of FE, albeit this result is not statistically
significant.
R15. The frequency and magnitude of sanctioning is the highest in the second round.
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Table 8: Sanction Determinants: the random-effects model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SANC SANC SANC MSANC MSANC MSANC
DIFSC 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.018* 0.876*** 0.865*** 0.270
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
FE -0.056 -0.034 -0.049 -1.148 -0.256 -0.877
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.91) (1.42) (0.88)
FEp 0.210*** 0.222*** 0.042* 3.894*** 4.386*** -1.022
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.91) (1.11) (1.42)
FExFEp -0.067 -1.652
(0.10) (1.81)
FEpxDIFSC 0.049*** 1.416***
(0.02) (0.33)
Round2 0.147** 0.140* 0.140* 2.990** 2.909** 2.765**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (1.36) (1.39) (1.36)
Round3 0.048 0.039 0.054 1.665 1.625 1.865
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (1.34) (1.37) (1.34)
Round4 0.082 0.062 0.061 1.943 1.890 1.447
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (1.37) (1.39) (1.36)
Round5 -0.046 -0.055 -0.053 0.868 0.844 0.731
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (1.36) (1.39) (1.36)
Round6 -0.011 -0.025 -0.019 2.255* 2.145 2.033
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (1.37) (1.39) (1.36)
cons -0.074 -0.047 0.010 -3.397** -3.484** -1.131
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (1.39) (1.37) (1.39)
chi2 45.906 42.760 52.899 51.113 51.989 72.504
N 270 270 270 270 270 270
r2 w 0.158 0.148 0.169 0.157 0.155 0.189
r2 b 0.171 0.216 0.272 0.255 0.294 0.437
r2 o 0.131 0.136 0.157 0.156 0.164 0.220
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Robust S.E Clustered at the individual level.
5 observations from Individuals who mis-specify their partners’ gender are excluded
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Table 9: Preference Questionnaire about Partner/Gender
(1) (2) (3)
Performance Partner Performance Other Gender Punishment Other Gender
FE -0.227 0.042 -0.233
(0.23) (0.21) (0.30)
FEp -0.283 0.220 0.440**
(0.26) (0.19) (0.20)
FExFEp 0.488 -0.261 0.493
(0.34) (0.25) (0.33)
FEpxAvDIFSC -0.109 -0.038 -0.139***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
AvDIFSC -0.181*** 0.059 0.056*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
cons 3.906*** 3.000*** 3.031***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
N 98 98 98
r2 0.474 0.083 0.245
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Bootstrapping 1000 replications
2 Individuals who mis-specify their partners’ gender are excluded.
avDIFSC is the average of DIFSC for each individual.
The second round coefficients are positive and statistically significant in all models.
After the second round, round effects appear to disappear.
4.5 The perception regression model.
As noted above, at the end of the experimental session participants were asked to answer
three questions regarding their gender preference and use a five-item scale to rank their
answers (from very good to very poor). The sample includes the 98 participants who
knew the gender of their partner. Table 9 presents the regression models using these
expressed preferences as a dependent variable. The AvDIFSC is the all-round average
difference in an individual’s score (positive if he/she outperformed, negative if he/she
under-performed), and FEp×AvDIFSC is the interaction term with the partner being
female.
The first column presents the results for the question “How do you evaluate your
partner’s performance?”. While many factors are insignificant, we find that:
R16. The better the relative performance of an individual, the lower the assessment
of his/her partner’s performance (and vice-versa).
In line with intuition, this result is confirmed by the negative coefficient of AvDIFSC.
R17. However, all things equal, subjects tend to be more critical of women than of
men, by under-estimating the ex-post performance of women.
This is reflected by the statistically significant negative coefficient of the interaction
term FEp× AvDIFSC.
The second column pertains to the question “In this experiment, considering the per-
formance of your partner, you believe that a [opposite gender as partner] would have
performed” for which we did not observe any significant results. Based solely on the sign
of coefficient of FEp, if the subject was paired with a woman, s/he tended to believe that
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if s/he had been paired with a man, the male partner would have performed better (and
this belief is stronger for men, as shown by the sign of FE × FEp). This suggests that
subjects naturally underestimate the performance of women.
The final column reports the results for the question “If your partner had been of the
opposite gender, how do you imagine s/he would have penalized you?”.
R18. As shown by the positive and significant coefficient of FEp, if a male had been
paired with a female, he believes that if the partner had been a man, he would have imposed
heavier sanctions.
Subjects naturally tended to believe that women would penalize less than men, which
is in line with the observed behavior in this experiment.
These answers suggest that negative gender stereotypes in the workplace still exists,
and they affect not only the men but also women themselves.
5 Conclusion
Gender discrimination in the workplace is an important research subject, which is moti-
vated by the still worrisome situation of women in many enterprises and work environ-
ments (Azmat and Petrongolo (2014)). The aim of this paper is to contribute to this
literature by developing a real-effort experiment in which pairs of individuals were asked
to “produce” correct answers in a counting task. In the experiment, subjects must count
7s in blocs of figures displayed successively on the computer screen (Mohnen et al. (2008),
Pokorny (2008), Vranceanu et al. (2014)). Partners on a team receive an equal share of
the team’s output as compensation. Furthermore, the best performer on a team is given
the option to impose a monetary sanction on the less-effective partner. As an original con-
tribution, in this paper we manipulate the gender composition of the teams, and observe
individual behavior in all-men, all-women and mixed teams.
Among the main results, we emphasize the following:
(1) On average, in this task men perform slightly better than women;
(2) Men’s individual performance is the strongest when paired with another man, and
will deteriorate when paired with women;
(3) Women paired with women will have a strong individual performance, but their
performance will deteriorate when paired with men;
(4) When underperforming, all other things equal, women are sanctioned more often
and more heavily than men;
(5) If sanctioned, women’s performance will not improve, whereas men tend to improve
their performance.
Compared to other real-effort tasks used in team production experiments (such as
coding and solving mazes), this task does not require any particular reasoning skills,
but draws heavily on attention, focus and resistance to boredom. One might argue that
according to ”die-hard” stereotypes, ”counting” is a task where men are expected to do
better than women, which would bias the results. While it seems hard to sustain such a
belief in our population of students recruited through a tough national competitive exam
(including maths), it would be interesting to study in future research whether the main
results hold if participants are required to perform a different task. Also, our results,
observed in two-person teams, might be less prominent in larger groups, in particular
since the incentive to free-ride on the punishment would be stronger. Finally, as for all
experiments, extreme caution is required when trying to extrapolate conclusions from
such a simple experiment to real life situations.
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With these caveats, our analysis can shed some light on the dynamics of performance
in teams. We observed that men tended to improve their performance from one round to
another when they were sanctioned, and the gain in performance was positively related
to the amount of the sanction. Thus, in all-men teams, internal punishment should con-
tribute to improve the team’s performance. Furthermore, as the sanction is proportional
to the difference in scores, in the long run, the gap in the performance of the two team
members should narrow to the lowest natural difference in abilities, with sanctions grad-
ually declining and stabilizing. However, we have shown that women do not respond to
sanctions by improving their performance (it might even slightly decrease). Furthermore,
should they under-perform, they receive larger sanctions than men, and these sanctions
are the most substantial when women are paired with men. Thus, in mixed teams where
man outperform his women team-mate, punishment might be counterproductive, by de-
teriorating motivation and reducing efforts.
In many enterprises and organizations, production was historically primarily com-
pleted by men. This is true for many mass-production processes in manufacturing and
construction, but also in many clerical jobs (consulting, law firms, and even in academia).
It is easy to understand why a norm of punishing defectors should emerge in such work
environments. With the accelerated feminization of many organizations, the gender com-
position of teams is changing rapidly. Yet, if norms do not change at the same pace, and
workers uniformly impose internal punishment, firms’ performances might well stagnate.
At one moment it might be useful to rediscover the value of forgiveness.
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APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
FE Indicator variable: [1] if the subject is female, [0] if else.
FEp Indicator variable: [1] if the subject is paired with a woman, [0] if else.
NRA The number of correct answers provided by the individual.
NRA(−1) The number of correct answers provided by the individual in the previous
round.
NBLOCK Number of blocks counted by the subject during the round
NTIMEOUT Number of times that the time-out button was pressed by the subject
during the round
DIFSC The difference between the number of correct responses of subject i and that of
his/her partner j: NRAi −NRAj in the current round
AvDIFSC The average of DIFSC over the 6 rounds for an individual
SANC Dummy variable: [1] if the subject penalizes his/her partner conditional on the
subject performing better than his/her partner.
MSANC The amount of penalty that the subject imposes on his/her partner when the
former performs better than his/her partner.
MSANC(−1) The amount of sanction imposed by the partner at the previous round
when an individual performed worse than the partner.
FExMSANC(−1) The interaction term between MSANC−1 and FE.
FExDIFSC(−1) The interaction term between DIFSC−1 and FE.
FEpxDIFSC The interaction between DIFSC and FEp.
FEpxAvDIFSC The interaction term between FEp and AvDIFSC.
Round# Dummies for each round.
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INSTRUCTIONS12
Slide 1.
Good morning. Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read these in-
structions carefully and, should you have any questions, raise your hand and call the
administrator. Communication between participants is forbidden. Please turn off cellular
phones. A payment in cash will be provided at the end of the session.
Slide 2. Personal characteristics
-You are: [A man / A woman]
-Your age is [X]
-Your education level is: [Baccalaureate+1,+2,+3,+4+5,+6 or more years of education]
Slide 3. About your partner
In this experiment you will be paired at random with another person present in this room;
this pairing is strictly anonymous.
-The gender of the partner is: [man/women]
-The age of the partner is: [X]
-The education level of the partner is: [Baccalaureate+1,+2,+3,+4+5,+6 or more years
of education]
Slide 4. Main rule
-You will be required to perform an effort task jointly with a partner, during 4 identical
rounds of the same experiment.
-Each round lasts for 4 minutes; the clock starts when you open the first active screen, and
stops after 4 minutes. During a round, the remaining time is displayed in red characters,
in the upper right corner of the screen (in seconds).
-A payoff in euros will be delivered at the end of the experiment. The payment is con-
nected to performance in the task, according to a rule known to everyone.
-Partners will be matched in pairs at random. Your partner will not change from one
round to another. His identity will not be revealed to you.
-During each round the computer displays a sequence of blocs of figures (0 to 9) in six
lines and 30 columns. Your task is to accurately count how many times the figure 7
appears in a bloc and then report this number in a box. The answer is considered correct
if it corresponds to the right number of 7s in the bloc, with a tolerated error margin of 1.
For instance, if the correct number of 7s is 30, answers 29, 30 and 31 will be considered
correct.
-Once the counted number of 7s is recorded in the box, you must press the “validate”
button, to save it. After you click, a new random block of figures is automatically gener-
ated and the effort task can continue.
-At any moment you can take a break by pressing the button “Take a break”. The break
stops the counting task for 20 seconds; a screen with ESSEC logo appears. If the round
stops in less than 20 seconds, breaks are no longer possible.
-At the end of each round the computer will display the total number of correct answers
that you have provided and the total number of correct answers provided by your partner.
-At the end of each round, before moving to the next round, the player who provided the
highest number of correct answers can, if he/she wants so, impose a fine on his/her part-
12Translated from French.
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ner. The decision belongs to him/her, it is not compulsory to impose the fine. In the event
that players have provided an identical number of correct answers, no sanction is possible.
Slide 5. The example slide - main decision screen
Slide 6. Compensation rule
Gains are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). For each round, the
payoff for one player is made up of three elements:
1. The compensation related to the effort task
2. A gain provided when taking a break
3. Less the penalty (if any)
Which are:
1. For each player, the ECU compensation related to the effort task is equal to half the
total number of correct answers provided by the team during the round, times 10.
For instance, if player 1 provided 8 correct answers and player 2 provided 5 correct an-
swers, the gain for each player related to the effort task is 0.5x(8+5)x10=65 ECUs
2. For each 20 second break, you will receive 6 ECU, whatever your compensation for the
effort task.
3. At the end of each round, before the next round starts, the player who provided the
largest number of correct answers can, if he wants to impose a fine on his partner, for an
amount between 1 and 30 ECUs. The gain of the partner is reduced by that amount. One
ECU in fines will cost the punisher 0.30 ECU. (No sanction is possible if players provide
the same number of correct answers)
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-At the end of the experiment, the total amount in ECU will be converted into euros at
the exchange rate 100 ECU = 2.5 euros.
Slide 8. Check questions.
To make sure that you have understood well the rules of the game, please answer these
questions:
Case 1.
During the round you got 4 right answers and your partner got 2 right answers. You took
two breaks.
Your gain in ECU is:
(a) 0.5*(4+2)*10+2*6; (b) (4+2)*10 + 2* 6; (c) I do not know
Case 2.
At the end of the round you got 4 right answers and your partner got 2 right answers.
Can you impose a fine on your partner?
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Don’t know
Can your partner impose a fine on you?
(a) Yes; (b) No; (c) Don’t know
Case 3.
At the end of the round you chose to impose a fine on your partner. The amount of the
fine can be:
(a) Between 1 and 10; (b) Between 1 and 30; (c) I do not know.
Slide 9.
Correct answers are:
Case 1.
-During the round you got 4 right answers and your partner got 2 right answers. You
took two breaks.
-The right answer is: you have half of the total points times 10, and the compensation
for the breaks (2 x 6 ECUs), that is a total of 0.5(4+2)*10 + 2x6
Case 2.
-You got 4 right answers and your partner got 2 right answers.
-Yes, you can impose a fine on him. Attention, this is an option; you do not need to
impose a fine.
-No, he cannot impose a fine on you
Case 3.
At the end of the round you chose to impose a fine on your partner. The amount of the
fine can be between 1 and 30. The payoff of your partner will be reduced by this amount.
Slide 10.
-If you have any questions, please raise your hand and address it to the administrator.
-If you are sure you have understood the rules of the game, you can press the button
below to launch the experiment.
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-The experiment starts when all subjects have pressed the button.
Slide 11. (Main decision screen)
Similar to “Example” in Slide 5 (but without the text on top of the screen; and the timer
on the right upper corner).
Slide 12. Results on task
-Your performance: Number of counted blocks [ ], Number of right answers [NRA1], Num-
ber of breaks [ ]
-The performance of your partner: Number of right answers [NRA2 ].
-[If NRA1 > NRA2 the computer displays] Do you want to impose a fine on the partner?
-You choose: Yes // No
-If you click Yes the computer displays “choose the amount of the fine” [A=1 to 30], then
”Validate”
Slide 12. Payoff for the round
-Your partner has imposed a fine on you [or /did not impose a fine on you]
-The amount of the fine is: [A]
-Your payoff for the round is: [ ]
At the end of the experiment (after the 6 rounds)
Question 1.
Please evaluate the performance of your partner:
-[very poor, poor, average, good, very good]
Question 2.
Your partner was:
-[A man, A woman, Don’t know]
Question 3.
In this experiment, considering the performance of you partner, you believe
that a [opposite gender partner] would have performed:
-[much worse, worse, the same, better, much better]
Question 4.
In this experiment, do you think that a [opposite gender partner] would have
applied a sanction:
-[much lower, lower, identical, higher, much higher]
Last slide
Thank you for having participated in this experiment.
The total gain for the experiment is [ ] euros.
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